Differential Privacy and the 2020 Decennial Census

Michael Hawes
Senior Advisor for Data Access and Privacy
Research and Methodology Directorate
U.S. Census Bureau

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Acknowledgements


For more information and technical details relating to the issues discussed in these slides, please contact the author at michael.b.hawes@census.gov.

Any opinions and viewpoints expressed in this presentation are the author's own, and do not necessarily represent the opinions or viewpoints of the U.S. Census Bureau.
Our Commitment to Data Stewardship

Data stewardship is central to the Census Bureau’s mission to produce high-quality statistics about the people and economy of the United States.

Our commitment to protect the privacy of our respondents and the confidentiality of their data is both a legal obligation and a core component of our institutional culture.
The Privacy Challenge

Every time you release any statistic calculated from a confidential data source you “leak” a small amount of private information.

If you release too many statistics, too accurately, you will eventually reveal the entire underlying confidential data source.

The Growing Privacy Threat

More Data and Faster Computers!

In today’s digital age, there has been a proliferation of databases that could potentially be used to attempt to undermine the privacy protections of our statistical data products.

Similarly, today’s computers are able to perform complex, large-scale calculations with increasing ease.

These parallel trends represent new threats to our ability to safeguard respondents’ data.
The Census Bureau’s Privacy Protections Over Time

Throughout its history, the Census Bureau has been at the forefront of the design and implementation of statistical methods to safeguard respondent data. Over the decades, as we have increased the number and detail of the data products we release, so too have we improved the statistical techniques we use to protect those data.

- Stopped publishing small area data: 1930
- Whole-table suppression: 1970
- Data swapping: 1990
- Formal Privacy: 2020
Reconstruction

The recreation of individual-level data from tabular or aggregate data.

If you release enough tables or statistics, eventually there will be a unique solution for what the underlying individual-level data were.

Computer algorithms can do this very easily.
Reconstruction: An Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Median Age</th>
<th>Mean Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Female</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reconstruction: An Example

This table can be expressed by 164 equations. Solving those equations takes 0.2 seconds on a 2013 MacBook Pro.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Female</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Re-identification

Linking public data to external data sources to re-identify specific individuals within the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jane Smith</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe Public</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Citizen</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

External Data

Confidential Data
In the News

Reconstruction and Re-identification are not just theoretical possibilities...they are happening!

- Massachusetts Governor’s Medical Records (Sweeney, 1997)
- AOL Search Queries (Barbaro and Zeller, 2006)
- Netflix Prize (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008)
- Washington State Medical Records (Sweeney, 2015)
- and many more…
Reconstructing the 2010 Census

• The 2010 Census collected information on the age, sex, race, ethnicity, and relationship (to householder) status for ~309 Million individuals. (1.9 Billion confidential data points)

• The 2010 Census data products released over 150 billion statistics

• We conducted an internal experiment to see if we could reconstruct and re-identify the 2010 Census records.
Reconstructing the 2010 Census: What Did We Find?

1. On the 309 million reconstructed records, census block and voting age (18+) were correctly reconstructed for all records and for all 6,207,027 inhabited blocks.

2. Block, sex, age (in years), race (OMB 63 categories), and ethnicity were reconstructed:
   1. Exactly for 46% of the population (142 million individuals)
   2. Within +/- one year for 71% of the population (219 million individuals)

3. Block, sex, and age were then linked to commercial data, which provided putative re-identification of 45% of the population (138 million individuals).

4. Name, block, sex, age, race, ethnicity were then compared to the confidential data, which yielded confirmed re-identifications for 38% of the putative re-identifications (52 million individuals).

5. For the confirmed re-identifications, race and ethnicity are learned correctly, though the attacker may still have uncertainty.
The Census Bureau’s Decision

• Advances in computing power and the availability of external data sources make database reconstruction and re-identification increasingly likely.

• The Census Bureau recognized that its traditional disclosure avoidance methods are increasingly insufficient to counter these risks.

• To meet its continuing obligations to safeguard respondent information, the Census Bureau has committed to modernizing its approach to privacy protections.
Differential Privacy

aka “Formal Privacy”
- quantifies the precise amount of privacy risk...
  - for all calculations/tables/data products produced...
    - no matter what external data is available...
      - now, or at any point in the future!
Precise amounts of noise

Differential privacy allows us to inject a precisely calibrated amount of noise into the data to control the privacy risk of any calculation or statistic.
Privacy vs. Accuracy

The only way to absolutely eliminate all risk of re-identification would be to never release any usable data.

Differential privacy allows you to quantify a precise level of “acceptable risk,” and to precisely calibrate where on the privacy/accuracy spectrum the resulting data will be.
Establishing a Privacy-loss Budget

This measure is called the “Privacy-loss Budget” (PLB) or “Epsilon.”

\[ \epsilon = 0 \] (perfect privacy) would result in completely useless data

\[ \epsilon = \infty \] (perfect accuracy) would result in releasing the data in fully identifiable form
Comparing Methods

**Data Accuracy**
Differential Privacy is not inherently better or worse than traditional disclosure avoidance methods.
Both can have varying degrees of impact on data quality depending on the parameters selected and the methods’ implementation.

**Privacy**
Differential Privacy is substantially better than traditional methods for protecting privacy, insofar as it actually allows for measurement of the privacy risk.
Implications for the 2020 Decennial Census

The switch to Differential Privacy will not change the constitutional mandate to apportion the House of Representatives according to the actual enumeration.

As in 2000 and 2010, the Census Bureau will apply privacy protections to the PL94-171 redistricting data.

The switch to Differential Privacy requires us to re-evaluate the quantity of statistics and tabulations that we will release, because each additional statistic uses up a fraction of the privacy-loss budget (epsilon).
Demonstrating Privacy, Assessing and Improving Accuracy

The DAS Team’s priorities over Fall 2019 were:

• To scale up the DAS to run on a (nearly) fully-specified national histogram
• To demonstrate that the DAS can effectively protect privacy at scale
• To permit the evaluation and optimization of the DAS for accuracy and “fitness for use”

These initiatives were largely successful, but much more work needs to be done over the remainder of this year.

The engagement and efforts of our data users have been enormously helpful in helping to identify and prioritize this remaining work.
Harvard Data Science Review Symposium

Held at Harvard University on October 25, 2019

Evaluated the DAS using public 1940 Census data

Assessments by teams of data users from:

- **NORC at the University of Chicago** – Sampling Efficiency and Funding Allocations
- **IPUMS at the University of Minnesota** – Racial Residential Segregation
- **W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research** – Scrubbed Segregation
Committee on National Statistics Workshop

December 11-12, 2019
Evaluation of 2010 Census data run through a preliminary version of the 2020 DAS
Data user assessments and findings on DAS implications for:
• Redistricting and related legal use cases
• Identification of rural and special populations
• Geospatial analysis of social/demographic conditions
• Delivery of government services
• Business and private sector applications
• Denominators for rates and baselines for assessments
What We’ve Learned: Accuracy

• The October vintage of the DAS falls short on ensuring “fitness for use” for several priority use cases.
• There are two sources of error in the TopDown Algorithm (TDA):
  • Measurement error due to differential privacy noise
  • Post-processing error due to statistical inference creating non-negative integer counts from the noisy measurements
• Post-processing error tends to be much larger than differential privacy error
• Positive bias in small counts/negative bias in large counts is the result of
  • Invariants
  • Post-processing error specifically introduced by our Non-negative Least Squares (L2) optimization routine
• Improving post-processing is not constrained by differential privacy
• Current initiatives include incorporating legal and political geographies into the geographic spine and adopting a multi-phase approach to post-processing
Revising Geographical Hierarchy to address count accuracy for AIANNH and INCPLACE/CDPs

**Old Hierarchy:**

- NATION
- REGIONS
- DIVISIONS
- STATES
  - Counties
    - Voting Districts
      - School Districts
    - Congressional Districts
    - Traffic Analysis Zones
    - County Subdivisions
    - Subminor Civil Divisions
  - Census Tracts
    - Block Groups
    - Census Blocks

- ZIP Code Tabulation Areas
- Urban Areas
- Core Based Statistical Areas
- Urban Growth Areas
- State Legislative Districts
- Public Use Microdata Areas

**AIANNH Areas**
- (American Indian, Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian Areas)

**New Approach (work in progress):**

- NATION
  - 52 State/State Equiv areas not in AIANNH
    - Principal Sub-state Political Geography
      - Relevant subdivisions
        - Non-AIANNH Census Blocks
  - 34 State areas in AIANNH
    - AIAN Areas
      - Relevant subdivisions
        - AIANNH Census Blocks
Making population counts more accurate.

Nearly all of the error in the 2010 Demonstration Data Products came from post-processing, not from differential privacy.

Old approach:
Single-pass post-processing:
• Optimize accuracy for ~1.2M histogram cells (2010 DDP used only ~400,000 cells).
• All cells must be integers
• All cells must be ≥0
• All margins must satisfy adding up constraints within and between levels of the geographic spine
• All invariants and structural zeros must hold exactly

New Approach (work in progress):
Multi-pass post-processing:
• First pass: compute total population and GQ populations
• Second pass for redistricting file (total pops constrained to first pass values)
• Third pass for population-estimates program. 3M tabs. (counts constrained to second pass values)
• Fourth pass: rest of DHC-H and DHC-P (counts constrained to values from passes above)
Making population counts more accurate.

A set of metrics are being developed based on use cases and stakeholder feedback. The metrics will allow the public to see the improvements that are made leading up to the finalization of the TopDown Algorithm (TDA).

The selected metrics will:

• Be straightforward and easy to interpret
• Reflect input from external data users;
• Show differences between major DAS runs and publicly available 2010 tabulations
• Provide accuracy, bias, and outlier information for basic demographic tabulations
• Provide accuracy, bias, and outlier information for categories of use cases

These metrics will inform data users of accuracy improvements we are able to make while also informing their ongoing engagement throughout the remaining work.
Questions?

Disclosure Avoidance and the 2020 Census Website
https://www.census.gov/about/policies/privacy/statistical_safeguards/disclosure-avoidance-2020-census.html

Michael Hawes
Senior Advisor for Data Access and Privacy
Research and Methodology Directorate
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301-763-1960 (Office)
michael.b.hawes@census.gov